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Finding a Voice: Silence and Its Significance for Transitional Justice 
 
 
 
 ‘Speech is civilization itself. The word, even the most 
contradictious word, preserves contact – it is silence 
which isolates’ (Mann 1967: 518). 
 
 ‘Silence has many faces…it is probably the most 
ambiguous of all linguistic forms’ (Jaworski 1993: 24). 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the story of The Reader, Michael Berg first meets Hanna Schmitz when he is 15 years old. 
They begin an intense sexual relationship and Hanna frequently asks Michael to read to her. 
One day, she suddenly disappears from his life. When he sees her again, she is in a 
courtroom, on trial with four other women for a heinous crime. During the Second World 
War, Hanna and her co-defendants had worked as guards in a camp near Cracow. According 
to the story, one night a fierce bombing raid took place and a church was set ablaze. The 
guards and troops had locked several hundred female prisoners inside this church, all of 
whom – with the exception of a mother and daughter – perished in the flames. Although the 
defendants could have unlocked the church doors and saved the women inside, they did 
nothing. During the trial years later, a report which formed part of the Schutzstaffel (SS) 
archives is produced as evidence; ‘The guards who remained behind, the report indicated, had 
allowed the fire to rage in the church and had kept the doors locked. Among the guards who 
remained behind, the report indicated, were the defendants’ (Schlink 2008: 124). After one of 
the defendants insists that it was Hanna who wrote the report, a claim which she herself 
trenchantly denies, the prosecutor suggests that a handwriting expert should be called. Hanna 
maintains that this is unnecessary and confesses to writing the report. Michael suddenly 
realizes that she has long been hiding something – the fact that she cannot read or write.  
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Hanna’s silence in this regard is central to the story and overall plot in The Reader. While it 
thus has a meta functionality, it also has a more personal function; it forms part of Hanna’s 
struggle (Schlink 2008: 133). Her silence is broken only at the end of the story – and broken 
by her as part of her success in teaching herself to read and write in prison. Following 
Hanna’s suicide, the day before she is due to be granted early release, the prison governor 
tells Michael that Hanna had asked for a writing manual: ‘…she didn’t try to hide it any 
longer. She was also just proud that she had succeeded, and wanted to share her happiness”’ 
(Schlink 2008: 204).  
 
There are many other significant silences in The Reader. For example, when Michael realizes 
that Hanna is illiterate, he thinks about speaking to the trial judge and telling him what he 
knows. The fact that he ultimately does nothing and remains silent implicitly raises important 
questions about silence and (in)justice. According to one commentator, ‘Michael is totally 
unaware that by not helping her [Hanna], he has repeated the conduct of some ordinary 
Germans during the Nazi era. Like them he stood idly by while someone he could have 
helped suffered an injustice’ (Roth 2004: 168–169). In this regard, Michael’s silence ‘speaks’ 
to a wider set of issues that extend beyond him as an individual. As the narrator of the story, 
however, it is his silence on the issue of Hanna’s guilt that is most pronounced. In the first 
part of the novel, he readily vocalizes his sentiments for her. As the reader learns about 
Hanna’s crimes, however, he provides few insights into what he is feeling. Does he judge 
her? Should he? Seemingly at a loss to know, ‘All he can offer is a silence compounded of 
horror, shame and guilt – “Should we only fall silent in revulsion, shame, and guilt?”…’ 
(Swales 2003: 13–14). 
 
3 
 
Michael’s own silence in this regard allows the author himself to avoid making any 
comments on Hanna’s guilt or responsibility. These silences in the novel appear paradoxical 
when one recalls that ‘this book is narrated by a fictional jurist and written by a real one’ 
(Alison 2006: 166). That Schlink avoids commenting on the culpability of his protagonist has 
necessarily invited much speculation about his own feelings towards Hanna – and how he 
wanted his readers to perceive her. Opinions on this issue remain divided. Stabbert (2009: 
172) maintains that Hanna’s ‘character and conduct are too reprehensible to accuse the author 
of creating a character we are supposed to pity’. Others, however, have suggested that 
Schlink wanted readers to feel sympathy for Hanna. For Alison (2006: 171), two factors are 
particularly telling in this regard, namely ‘Hanna’s crime ultimately was one of omission’ and 
‘the fire itself was caused by the Allies’. The key point is that Schlink’s own silences have 
created a moral ambiguity at the heart of the novel, deepened by the fact that Hanna herself 
remains silent about what she did as a SS guard. 
 
If the story of The Reader highlights different layers and types of silence, and their 
complexities, it is striking that the notion of silence is often construed in negative terms. As 
one illustration, Ahrens (2006: 263) posits that ‘Silence is…emblematic of powerlessness in 
our society. It is therefore not surprising that rape survivors often remain silent about their 
experiences’. The idea for this article developed out of my own research with victims–
/survivors1 of conflict-related related sexual violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) (see, for 
example, Clark 2017a; Clark 2017b). Time and time again, I have been told – primarily by 
members of civil society in BiH – that women2 who suffered sexual violence during the 
1992-1995 Bosnian war do not want to talk. These women are tired of telling their stories 
and/or afraid of speaking out due to the possible reactions of others. While it is indeed 
challenging to find female (and especially male) victims–/survivors of sexual violence who 
4 
 
are willing to participate in research, dominant explanations for their ‘silences’ are too 
simplistic and convey only one aspect of a more complex story. As Milliken and Morrison 
(2003: 1565) point out, ‘Since silence is a behaviour with multiple causes, it is a behaviour 
that is hard to interpret. People who observe silence have to try to make sense of a 
manifestation that looks the same but actually signals potentially quite different states of 
mind in the actor’. In particular, the notion of imposed silences detracts from the possible 
utility of silence, as well as from its agentic dimensions (Johnson 2011: 60). Fundamentally, 
rather than simply seeing the imperatives of silence as coming from the ‘outside’, it is more 
helpful to think about how individuals internally negotiate and navigate these external 
imperatives. This point can be usefully highlighted using the analogy of corollary discharge 
(Sperry 1950), a concept from the field of neuroscience. 
 
 Corollary discharge – also known as ‘efference copy’ (Feinberg 1978: 636) – is 
quintessentially about the relationship between internal and external. In relation to sight, for 
example, corollary discharge refers to eye movement and how our eyes respond to self-
generated and external movement. To cite Frith and Done (1988: 438), ‘corollary discharge is 
part of an internal monitoring system that enables us to distinguish between effects due to our 
own actions (eye movements) and events in the world outside’. Applied to an auditory 
context, corollary discharge helps individuals to differentiate between internally generated 
and externally generated sounds (Levin 2006: 1228).3 Sometimes, however, corollary 
discharge ‘malfunctions’ and these crucial distinctions are not made. Faulty interpretations 
may occur, for example, ‘if there is a discrepancy between the observed movements of the 
image on the retina and those expected on the basis of corollary discharge…’ (Frith and Done 
1988: 438).  
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Relating the concept of corollary discharge to silence, the key point is that silence can be a 
response to both ‘internally and externally generated percepts’ (Ford and Mathalon 2005: 
180) that operate across – and reflect – different types of ‘synaptic connectivity’ (Poulet and 
Hedwig 2006: 14). To over-emphasize the external can thus result in a ‘faulty interpretation’ 
that simplifies the complex ontologies of silence. More specifically, the elevation of 
externally generated percepts – in this case external factors that impose silence – can cause a 
‘discrepancy’ that marginalizes the agentic and functional properties of silence (Das 1996: 
85). 
 
Underscoring these properties, and emphasizing that silence is itself a form of 
communication, the article’s central premise is that silence should be allowed to ‘speak’. This 
argument is developed not simply in the abstract, but specifically in relation to transitional 
justice – the process of addressing past human rights abuses through judicial and non-judicial 
measures (United Nations 2010). On the surface at least, there appears to be little place for 
silence within transitional justice. The latter is quintessentially about voice and about truth-
telling, about creating a factual record of what happened.  Obradović-Wochnik (2013: 330) 
thus notes that ‘Fighting against silence is such a deeply entrenched approach of transitional 
justice that critical reflections on “silence” are rare’. It is precisely the aim of this article, 
however, to demonstrate that silence is highly relevant to transitional justice and should be 
taken more seriously. Drawing on Norrie’s (2010) discussion of absence, the article explores 
two possible and inter-related functions of silence – as a form of resistance and as a survival 
strategy. It uses these functionalities to illustrate a dialectical relationship between silence as 
being and becoming, a relationship which in turn foregrounds the transformative possibilities 
of silence and their significance for transitional justice. 
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Framing and Conceptualizing Silence  
 
Silence can be something that we crave, something that we desperately need in order to think, 
to write, to rest. Silence, however, is not simply an absence (Ollin 2008: 266). Physical 
qualities can be attributed to it; it can be ‘long, heavy, cold or hard (a wall of silence)’ 
(Jaworski 1993: 82). Moreover, it has multiple dimensions, reflecting the fact that it is 
‘inherently spatial and temporal’ (Acheson 2008: 545). It can fill a space, such as a room or a 
forest (Acheson 2008: 545). It can also be something that we ourselves endeavour to fill, 
particularly in situations – like a first date or a long taxi ride – where silence can feel 
awkward and uncomfortable. This can result in ‘an active resistance towards silence’, in 
which there is a perceived need to fill silences with words (Sutton 2002: 30). Conversation is 
supposed to ‘flow’, and not to be punctuated with gaps where nobody is speaking. Depending 
on how it is framed and positioned, therefore, some might construe silence as ‘flagging 
something unusual or troublesome…’ (Mushin and Gardner 2009: 2035).  
 
This problematization of silence has nevertheless been challenged, particularly within the 
field of education. In many Western education systems, there is a strong accent on verbal 
forms of communication and interaction (Jaworski 1993: 22). There is accordingly little 
space for silence in the classroom, except when teachers specifically request it, which can 
have the effect of marginalizing children and young people who are accustomed to different 
learning cultures and education systems.4 These individuals may be perceived as 
academically deficient or insufficiently motivated. Hao (2011: 268), for example, reflects that 
‘As a student in the Philippines, performing silence was a natural, sedimented ritual. When 
attending classes in the US, I wondered why my performances of silence were not considered 
“normal” here…’. Conceptualizing silence as a ‘pedagogical performance’ (Hao 2011: 268), 
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he underscores that silence – like speech – is a dialogic act that has a place within the 
classroom (Hao 2011: 280). It is therefore critical that we do not ‘silence silences’; by doing 
so, we ‘reaffirm the primacy of speech and perpetuate the dominant groups’ speech as the 
norm at the macro level’ (Li 2004: 82). 
 
The relationship between speech and silence, however, cannot be captured in simplistic 
dichotomies and binary frames positioning speech and silence as opposites. Not only do the 
two closely intersect (Picard 1952: 16; Jaworski 1993: 17); they also complement each other. 
By way of illustration, Acheson (2008: 535) remarks that ‘We perceive a tune only when 
silences, however short, mark the beginning and the end; we hear the silence after the last 
note dies away only because that song has ended and the next has not yet begun’. The same 
point can be made vis-à-vis silence and speech. Speech effectively helps silence to be ‘heard’ 
and to be noticed (Gurevitch 2001: 102, n 12), just as ‘a sentence without absences, pauses or 
spaces would be unintelligible’ (Norrie 2010: 39). 
 
The broader point is that silence can itself constitute an important and multi-layered form of 
communication (Pagis 2010: 324; Hao 2011: 270). Indeed, silence can contribute to ensuring 
that channels of communication between people remain open (Jaworski 1993: 49). In the 
middle of a heated argument, for example, keeping silent and ‘biting one’s tongue’ guards 
against the utterance of angry words that might ultimately be regretted and destroy a 
relationship. At a more macro level, silence and the avoidance of particular topics or 
problems can also be a way of defusing potential conflict between State actors. As one of its 
dispute management strategies, for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) ‘focuses on issues of mutual interest which offer greater possibility of conciliation. 
Contentious and difficult matters that are less likely to yield results are put away for a later 
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period’ (Jetly 2003: 58). Yet, this does not mean that silence is an easy option, a deflective 
strategy for keeping a false peace. While only one person is needed to produce speech, 
silence is necessarily a more collaborative endeavour in which all are required to co-operate 
(Pittinger et al. 1960: 88).5  
 
If silence can be highly communicative, Jaworski underlines that it is not inherently so; 
‘when examined from the perspective of a given pragmatic framework, it can be 
communicatively relevant or irrelevant’ (Jaworski 1993: 95). It therefore follows that silence 
does not have a fixed and bounded meaning (Poland and Pederson 1998: 294). Rather, its 
significance is culturally and contextually situated (Creed 2003: 1507). In his work with the 
Western Apache in Arizona, Basso (1970: 225) described how ‘…keeping silent in Western 
Apache culture is associated with social situations in which participants perceive their 
relationships vis-à-vis one another to be ambiguous and/or unpredictable’. To take a very 
different example, the so-called ‘spiral of silence theory’ (Noelle-Neumann 1974) posits that 
people will remain silent when they fear that those ‘around’ them – including on social 
media6 – do not support their opinions. If a social environment can thereby induce silence, 
whether or not it actually does so (and to what extent) may depend on the particular issue at 
stake.  Gearhart and Zhang’s (2018: 49) research has suggested that ‘…issue differences are 
just one of many contextual influences on opinion expression in the spiral of silence theory’. 
 
It is therefore essential to allow silence to ‘speak’, and one way in which to do so is to refrain 
from making a priori assumptions about what it means and conveys. To take an example, 
gender can be a factor in explaining silence; this is discussed in more detail in the next 
section. However, this does not mean that silence should be pre-emptively viewed as a 
reflection, inter alia, of powerlessness, fear or subjugation (Motsemme 2004: 917).7 To 
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conceptualize it in this way is to foreground what Covarrubius has termed ‘consumptive 
silence’, a framing in which ‘the self can be seen as unempowered as when silence is 
imposed for purposes of oppression’ (Covarrubius 2007: 268). This article maintains that an 
over-emphasis on ‘consumptive silence’ – or more broadly what Baker (1955: 158) has 
termed ‘negative’ silence – is inherently limiting. To return to the aforementioned corollary 
discharge analogy, focusing only on the external imposition of silence can bring about a 
‘faulty interpretation’ that fails to sufficiently distinguish between the internal and external 
factors involved in creating and sustaining silence – and how they intersect.  
 
Negotiated silence, for example, is a silence that is ‘discursively brought about between 
significantly related parties and in social interaction…’ (Kebede et al. 2014: 675). In other 
words, the relationship is not one-way. An example from BiH usefully highlights this point. 
The existence of social stigma in BiH has contributed to silencing some victims–/survivors of 
sexual violence; they are afraid of speaking out, fearful of how others (including spouses and 
family members) might react (Clark 2017a: 97,102; Clark 2018: 520–521). To accentuate the 
enforced nature of this silence, however, conceals a more complex dynamic. Some victims–
/survivors negotiate the terms on which they will speak (Clark 2017a: 427); some speak out 
when they feel that it is in their interests to do so (for example, when it might lead to their 
perpetrators being prosecuted and convicted). Hence, they themselves both contribute to and 
challenge the silence. 
 
Covarrubius (2007: 226) contrasts ‘consumptive silence’ with a more agentic form of silence 
that she calls ‘generative silence’. In generative forms of silence, she explains, ‘interactants 
are seen to engage in a fertile communication activity wherein people affirm the self and each 
other personally, interpersonally, culturally, and even metaphysically’ (Covarrubius 2007: 
10 
 
268). Generative silences, in other words, have an important illocutionary or intentional 
dimension. In this way, they point to a more nuanced relationship between internal and 
external, thereby reflecting – rather than silencing – the complexity of meanings that silence 
can denote. It is essential to acknowledge these different meanings – and hence the many 
layers of silence. This is a prerequisite for a sophisticated and ‘fine-grained, interdisciplinary 
analysis’ (Jaworski and Sachdev 1998: 294).  
 
Reflection on the granularities of silence, as part of such an analysis, brings forth the concept 
of temporal granularity. Typically discussed in relation to data management and modelling of 
anchored and unanchored temporal data ‘of multiple granularities’ (Goralwalla et al. 2001: 
41), temporal granularity ‘is a unit of a time selected from a set of possible time scales such 
as seconds, minutes, hours, or decades’ (Cousin and Kahn 1991: 352). Kidron’s work with 
(adult) children of Holocaust survivors implicitly demonstrates that there are different 
temporal granularities in the operationalization of silence. One of her interviewees, Eve, 
disclosed that while her parents had never talked to her about the Holocaust, her mother had 
often cried in her sleep. In Eve’s words, thus, the Holocaust was ‘present in my home’ 
(Kidron 2009: 5). After speaking to Eve, Kidron stopped asking interviewees what they knew 
about the Holocaust and instead asked them whether it was present in their homes. Her cross-
temporal analysis of the ‘silent presence of the Holocaust in the everyday life of the survivor 
home’ (Kidron 2009: 6) thus highlights the granularities of silences across different temporal 
fields. 
 
These granularities make it clear that silence is not something solid and fixed. There is a 
natural movement and granular flow, linked to the aforementioned contextual properties of 
silence (Creed 2003: 1507), which, in turn, foregrounds an important processual element. 
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Ontologically, silence is an inwardly reflective state of being, yet this is not its sum total. 
Highly pertinent in this regard is Norrie’s discussion of absence. Drawing on Bhaskar’s 
(2008) work on critical realism, he notes that ‘…Bhaskar wants to deploy the concept of 
absence both in terms of being and (especially) non-being, and in terms of doing and 
(especially) undoing – or, better, negating’ (Norrie 2010: 23). Absence, thus, can be both a 
noun (absence) and an active verb (absenting), which points to its role ‘as a form of (non-) 
being and as present in processes of change’ (Norrie 2010: 23). Hence, there is a significant 
transformative dynamic between absence and absenting. The shift from one to the other is a 
process of change, and Bhaskar’s premise is that ‘any process of change can be analysed in 
terms of absenting what was previously in existence in favour of what has come to be’ 
(Norrie 2010: 29).  
 
This dialectic between absence and absenting, and the absenting of ‘what was’ to make room 
for what ‘might be’ exemplifies what Norrie (2010: 2) refers to as ‘the intrinsic relationship 
between being and becoming in dialectical critical realism’. This relationship, it is argued, is 
highly relevant for thinking about silence. If silence constitutes a form of absence, the 
‘absenting of absences’ (Norrie 2010: 28) in this regard points to the fact that silence is also 
much more than absence. Quintessentially, silence is not only about being. It is also about 
becoming and the processual dynamics inherent in this being-becoming dialectic. The next 
section develops this argument by exploring two particular functionalities of silence, namely 
resistance and survival. 
 
The concepts of resistance and survival are closely inter-linked. To resist can be a way to 
survive, and to survive can be a form of resistance. An illustration of this is Haddad’s 
research on the manyano (prayer union) movement in South Africa.8. According to her, the 
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unique characteristics of the manyano – such as the wearing of a church uniform – ‘are forms 
of resistance to ecclesial and patriarchal domination and enable literal survival by 
marginalised women’ (Haddad 2004: 11). On a deeper level, there is also a crucial 
transformative thread that connects resistance and survival. Fundamentally, both of them 
reflect the ‘transformative possibilities of silence’ (Rowe and Malhotra 2013: 1) that reside in 
the dynamics of being-becoming. 
 
Silence, Resistance and Survival 
 
If absence is both a noun and a verb, we can similarly draw a distinction between silence and 
silencing. Yet, while the notion of ‘absenting’ can be positive and enabling of change, the 
idea of ‘silencing’ has more negative connotations. What this section seeks to demonstrate, 
through a focus on the themes of resistance and survival, is that there is much more to silence 
than ‘silencing’ (Wagner 2012: 102). This is not to say that silence is never the result of 
silencing. However, it is necessary to think about causality in more nuanced terms. As its 
starting point, this chapter situates these arguments within a gender frame. 
 
Silence as resistance 
 
A comprehensive discussion of silence cannot ignore the issue of gender. Notwithstanding 
the ‘fluid and polyvalent essence of silence’ (Hatzisavvidou 2015: 512), it is important to 
acknowledge that silence can be the result – or at least partly the result – of silencing. This 
necessarily brings forth a significant gender aspect of silence. In Under the Tongue, for 
example, a powerful novel about the problem of incest in Zimbabwe during the 1970s, the 
rape of young Zhizha by her own father remains shrouded in silence. The central character in 
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the story, Zhizha’s grandmother, asks her (own) husband: ‘Can a woman not speak the word 
that oppresses her heart, grows heavy on her tongue, heavy, pulling her to the ground?...Will 
my word grow into a tree while I water it every day with silence?’ (Vera 2002: 166).  The 
weight of this silence feels heavy and oppressive. It is not a chosen silence but a required 
silence that is intimately connected to the gendered positionality of Zhizha and her 
grandmother. In a very different context, Burman discusses the silencing of female 
indigenous activists in Bolivia. Drawing attention to a range of gendered factors, including 
the exploitation of female labour and the devaluation of ‘female’ domestic roles, he 
underscores that  ‘The silencing of women in public and political contexts is certainly only 
one aspect of female subordination in Bolivia’ (Burman 2011: 73–74). Gender can also 
silence men in various ways. The existence of ‘restrictive masculinity norms’ (Addis and 
Mahalik 2003: 12), for example, and ‘social ideals about gender’ (Weiss 2010: 277) can 
contribute to silencing men and boys who have suffered sexual violence or abuse (O’Leary 
and Barber 2008). 
 
If these norms and social ideals necessarily have an important contextual and located 
dimension, this highlights the broader point that gender can produce further silencing effects 
when it intersects with factors such as race, ethnicity, class and culture (Naples 2003: 1168). 
Dotson (2011: 244–245), for example, notes that domestic violence in African-American 
communities ‘is often shrouded in silence’. One explanation is that open discussion about this 
issue might be understood as reinforcing and entrenching cultural and racial stereotypes of 
‘the imagined “violent” black male’ (Dotson 2011: 244–245). Crenshaw (1992: 1472) has 
made similar arguments regarding the sexual harassment of Afro-American women. In their 
research with survivors of childhood sexual abuse who identified themselves as Latina 
women, Ligiéro et al. discuss how demarcated gender roles can combine with cultural norms 
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and expectations to silence women. In particular, some of the women in the study identified 
the family – and specifically the protection of elderly family members – as a cultural norm 
that has a silencing effect (Ligiéro et al. 2009: 73). Certain cultural practices can also have 
gendered silencing effects. Female genital mutilation demands silent acquiescence, while 
additionally effecting a concomitant (and embodied) form of silencing via the removal of a 
part of women’s genitalia that can give deep pleasure and enjoyment during sexual 
intercourse (Broussard 2008: 26). 
 
If the above illustrations underscore the interconnections between silence and power 
relations, gender is one factor that goes to the very core of these power dynamics. Hence, 
silence must be read and interpreted within the wider gendered context in which it is 
expressed and utilized. During her work with battered women in India, for example, Hegde 
met a 24-year-old woman called Sushila. While arranged marriages were the norm in her 
community, Sushila was intent on making her own choices. She decided to wed a man with 
no education, but the marriage ran into difficulties due to his possessiveness. During one of 
their arguments, Sushila – who had a high school diploma – referred to her husband’s lack of 
education. He felt angry and insulted, and consequently threw her out. Sushila’s own family 
offered little support and blamed her for marrying the wrong man. Having no one else to turn 
to, she went back to her husband and he continued to be abusive; ‘She was too scared to tell 
anyone lest he found out; she was completely silenced…’ (Hegde 1996: 307).  
 
While Sushila’s story strongly foregrounds the thematic of enforced silence, there is more to 
it than just silencing. Central in this regard is the concept of causality. As Bhaskar theorizes 
it, causality is not only about A causing B. It also involves a process of absenting; and ‘since 
causation is closely linked to change, processes of causation are processes of absenting 
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previously given states of being’ (Norrie 2010: 29-30). If Sushila’s silence (B) is viewed 
solely through the prism of structural constraints (A), this foregrounds a one-way causal 
dynamic between the two that potentially conceals a more complex causality. Hence, rather 
than framing her silence simply in terms of what has caused it, it is also essential to reflect on 
what this causal process is absenting. Looked at from this angle, Sushila’s silence can also be 
viewed in more agentic terms as a form of resistance to male domination. ‘My silence’, she 
reflects, ‘taught me patience; now I have courage’ (cited in Hegde 1996: 307). Her silence, in 
other words, is more than just a state of being. Her silence makes her stronger, and the 
absenting of her former self is a process of becoming. This absenting process, in turn, is also 
a process of change, and thus it has its own causality dynamics which complexify the notion 
that A causes B. In fact, B can also affect A. Reshaping the concept of causality in this way 
brings forth a more agentic dimension of silence, in keeping with Covarrubius’ 
aforementioned ‘generative silence’ (2007: 226). The crucial point is that there is more to 
gendered silences than enforced silence. 
 
Widening the focus beyond gender and silence, Mathiesen discusses what he terms ‘political 
silencing’. In this political sense, he argues, ‘“Silence”…is a continuum, from silence despite 
disagreement (grudgingly you go along) to silence as an accepting attitude (you accept the 
standpoint, not even noticing that silencing has taken place, or at least not taking the fact of 
silencing seriously’ (Mathiesen 2004: 9). This notion of a continuum further underscores that 
silence is not merely a causal fixed state of being. There will often be scope, even if it is 
limited, for transformative agentic manoeuvre and negotiation that potentially allows silence 
to become something more than just absence (Gatwiri and Mumbi 2016: 13). Fivush (2010: 
90), for example, notes that while marginalized groups ‘may be silenced at one level by the 
dominant cultural narrative’, they may nevertheless develop within the group their own 
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‘resistance narratives’ that ‘challenge the explanations and moral imperatives imposed by the 
dominant narrative…’. 
 
If silence as resistance represents a becoming, and if the process of becoming is an absenting 
of what was, this points to a crucial nexus between the concepts of becoming and presence. 
For Davidson and Correia (2001: 76), ‘becoming’ represents ‘maximal self disclosure – being 
totally present’. Exploring this idea in a musical context through a focus on individual 
experiences of ‘becoming’, they emphasize ‘the deep level of the relationship between 
ourselves and our bodies in the moment of the performance’ (Davidson and Correia 2001: 
79). This accent on bodies, in turn, illuminates an important embodied aspect of silence. 
Silence is not simply heard but ‘felt’ within bodies (Acheson 2008: 547). It is also through 
their bodies that individuals can silently resist and achieve ‘presence’ through their 
becoming.  
 
Illustrating this point, Gatwiri and Mumbi undertook a study in Kenya focused on women 
living with fistula. They sought to explore how the 30 women used silence as a way of 
renegotiating the patriarchal spaces which framed their everyday lives (Gatwiri and Mumbi 
2016: 15). One of the women in the study, Akinyi, had vaginal fistula after giving birth to her 
sixth child and was adamant that she did not want to have any more children. She disclosed 
that after her forthcoming reconstructive surgery, she would ask the nurse for contraception. 
This was information that she was not going to share with her husband, and in this regard her 
silence can be read as embodied resistance to a patriarchal and socio-cultural environment in 
which husbands typically choose how many children their wives will have. Crucially, ‘In 
applying silence by withholding information from her husband, Akinyi sought to have 
ownership and control over her reproductive choices and also protect her body from further 
17 
 
traumatic reproductive health crises…’ (Gatwiri and Mumbi 2016: 16). Akinyi thus made her 
body ‘present’ by asserting what could and could not be done to it. 
 
In a very different context, an example from the small town of Foča in eastern BiH further 
demonstrates how bodies can silently communicate resistance. Early in the Bosnian war, 
Bosniaks started leaving Foča; ‘Muslim houses were being set on fire. Sporadic shooting 
started. Those who could leave the region did so. The others decided to hide in the woods for 
fear of being burned in their houses while they were sleeping’ (Prosecutor v. Kunarac et al. 
2001: §20). Fighting in Foča, which had a Bosniak majority prior to the war,9 started on 8 
April 1992, and Serb forces had taken control of the town by mid-April that year (Prosecutor 
v. Kunarac et al. 2001: §21). Small numbers of Bosniaks started to return to Foča in 2000, 
five years after the Bosnian war ended (International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 
2011).10 These acts of return represent acts of embodied resistance that silently contest the 
status quo. To cite Eastmond and Selimovic (2012: 520), ‘The returnees challenged the 
dominant narrative11 not through verbal articulations but through the act of “just” being 
there’. By absenting the absence that existed when there were no Bosniaks left in Foča, the 
returnees’ physical presence represents a significant becoming – and thus change. In 
particular, their silent presence powerfully communicates the message that Bosniaks in Foča 
cannot be ‘absented’, just as the crimes committed against them cannot be ignored or 
forgotten. 
 
If silence has an important embodied dimension, the example of Foča also illustrates how the 
spaces with which bodies synergistically interact can themselves become sites of resistance. 
Pickering’s discussion of police raids in loyalist and republican homes in Northern Ireland 
further illuminates this point. Describing how some women silently opposed these raids12 by 
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transforming their homes into sites of resistance, Pickering (2000: 64) notes that one way in 
which they did so was by ‘preparing for raids as a regular part of life’. This meant, inter alia, 
taking steps to ensure that their homes ‘were immaculately clean and beyond reproach from 
the jibes and appraisal of the security forces’ (Pickering 2000: 64). Of course, it might be 
argued that through the act of keeping their homes clean, the women were simply performing 
traditional gender roles; and indeed, this is true up to a point. Crucially, ‘During the raids, 
women wanted to carry on normal life while their homes were being pulled apart’ (Pickering 
2000: 65). At the same time, however, the transformation of their homes into spaces of silent 
resistance took them outside the home, thereby challenging traditional gender norms and, by 
extension, the dichotomization of private (domestic) and public (Pickering 2000: 71). 
Fundamentally, their resistance ‘moved women into an external engagement with politics and 
activism within their communities’ (Pickering 2000: 66). 
 
If the women’s silence can thus be conceptualized as ‘change-directed absenting’ (Norrie 
2010: 31), this reinforces the argument that the causality involved in silencing is not simply 
one way. To narrowly view it as such overlooks the fact that causality is significantly tied to 
space and time. The relationship between the three is one of ‘co-embeddedness’, thereby 
reflecting the ‘spatio-temporal processuality of being in the world’ (Norrie 2010: 31). 
Thinking more about this co-embeddedness can usefully guide the theorization of silence as a 
form of survival. 
 
Silence as survival  
 
From the late 1980s onwards, the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) in northern Uganda 
abducted and forcibly recruited thousands of children during a period of two decades (Ellison 
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2015). Those who survived subsequently returned to their communities, but silence was a 
strictly-enforced form of control in the LRA and some returnees still refuse to break this code 
of silence. According to Baines and Stewart (2011: 249), ‘They fear they could be overheard 
by the wrong person, with fatal consequences’. In this way, the silences of the formerly 
abducted children function as a survival strategy within community spaces in northern 
Uganda (Baines and Stewart 2011: 249). 
 
What this example also demonstrates is that silence has an important temporal dimension, 
reflecting different temporal granularities. If silence can bring the past into the present, as 
previously discussed in relation to Kidron’s (2009) work on the Holocaust, the imperative of 
silence can have a cross-temporal dimension that ‘carries over’ from a conflict situation to a 
post-conflict situation. This is so particularly when the ‘post-conflict’ environment is itself 
defined by high levels of inter-personal violence. El Salvador is a case in point. Between 
1980 and 1992, the military-led government fought against the left-wing Farabundo Martí 
National Liberation Front. Through the use of terror tactics, the State sought to silence 
communities as a way of depoliticizing them and silence became for them a learned survival 
strategy (Hume 2008: 70). The formal cessation of the war in 1992 did not bring an end to the 
violence and bloodshed. The country has a deep-rooted gang culture that feeds public 
insecurity (Wolf 2017: 3), one of the highest murder rates in the world (International Crisis 
Group 2017) and ‘the awful distinction of having the highest rate of gender-based killings of 
women and girls in Central America’ (Zeid Ra'ad Al Hussein, cited in UN News 2017). In 
this spatio-temporal environment, thus, there is a continuing role and need for silence (Hume 
2008: 71).   
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In microbiology, it is the formation of protective biofilms – defined as ‘structurally and 
dynamically complex biological systems’ (Hall-Stoodley et al. 2004: 95) – that allows 
bacterial cells (prokaryotes) to survive in hostile environments (Arciola et al. 2018: 397). By 
way of analogy, and building on the above examples from Uganda and El Salvador, silence 
can be viewed as a type of biofilm that has a protective function and enables survival – in the 
sense of both being and becoming – in environments where speaking out could expose 
individuals and communities to significant risk. That this protective function is spatially-
temporally constituted, moreover, underlines that the relationship between silence and 
survival extends beyond purely physical survival.  One particular illustration of the critical 
nexus between silence as an inner state of being and an agentic process of becoming is 
artistic/creative survival. 
 
In his work on the life and art of the late Victorian short story writer, novelist and poet 
Rudyard Kipling, Gilbert repeatedly returns to the theme of silence. Kipling, he argues, was 
‘deeply committed to silence’, not only in his personal life but also in his work as a writer 
(Gilbert 1986: 116). If, as Kipling’s silences suggest, ‘the survival of an artist depends, to a 
very great extent, on his knowing when and how to keep silent’ (Gilbert 1986: 118), a very 
different spatio-temporal example from the West African state of Guinea further substantiates 
this point. In December 2008, a military junta seized power in Guinea, following a successful 
coup d’état (this was preceded by the death of President Lansana Conté). The new regime 
became increasingly unstable and unpopular, due to its violent excesses and brutality 
(European Parliament 2013: 5); and by the summer of 2009, there were widespread popular 
protests in Conakry. Noticeably absent from these protests were the capital’s musicians, but 
their silences reflected more than just concerns about physical survival. At stake was also 
their survival as artists – and, by extension, their economic survival. Their strong financial 
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dependency on the patronage of elites, for example, meant that they had a strong economic 
interest in maintaining good relations with the new regime (or indeed any ruling regime) 
(Dave 2014: 17).  
 
These examples further raise the issue of agency. Returning to Kipling’s use of silence, 
Gilbert conceptualizes this as an awareness or recognition of the limitations of language in 
capturing the fundamental essence of being. Throughout his life, Kipling ‘was engaged in a 
kind of ontological quest for what he often referred to as “things-as-they-are”’ (Gilbert 1986: 
121); and he remained preoccupied with what he saw as a critical discrepancy between 
‘“things-as-they-are” and those same things as mediated and inevitably distorted by 
language’ (Gilbert 1986: 122). As a survival strategy, it is important to underline that silence 
is not simply about responding to things ‘as they are’ or passively accepting the status quo. It 
is also about positively adapting to them and silently negotiating for the best possible 
outcome (Gatwiri and Mumbi 2016: 13). In this regard, silence can be understood as a 
potential ‘place of possibility’ (Rowe and Malhotra 2013: 3), at the core of which is the 
transformative dialectic between being and becoming. 
 
This section has explored some of the different ways in which silence can function as a form 
of resistance and as a survival strategy. In so doing, it has used a wide range and variety of 
different examples and illustrations that one would not necessarily put together. This was a 
deliberate choice, as a way of mirroring a seemingly anachronistic juxtaposition that lies at 
the heart of this paper – the juxtaposition of silence and transitional justice. The final section 
will demonstrate why silence matters for transitional justice and why it should, accordingly, 
be given more attention. 
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Silence and Transitional Justice 
 
Transitional justice refers to ‘a set of measures and processes adopted to deal with the 
consequences of mass human rights violations in the aftermath of regime changes, violent 
conflicts, wars, and other historical injustices…’ (David 2017: 151). These measures can 
include criminal trials, truth and reconciliation commissions (TRCs), memorials, apologies 
and reparations. At first glance, silence appears to have no obvious – or even legitimate – 
place within transitional justice. Kovras (2012: 732) notes how the expansion of transitional 
justice has created ‘normative pressures’ that ‘encourage societies to overturn prolonged 
silences, even several decades after transition…’. Switching the focus to those who have 
suffered human rights abuses, Alcalá and Baines (2012: 391) point out that ‘the transitional 
justice literature has looked with suspicion on survivors’ silence in judicial or community 
scenarios and built a repertoire of psychosocial interventions and strategies of “reparative 
remembering”…’. Transitional justice is concerned with establishing the facts, creating 
spaces for truth telling and thereby ‘breaking’ silence (Frichova 2009; Boraine 2006: 23). 
Hence, the existence of silence seemingly undermines the very raison d’être of transitional 
justice, particularly when it is viewed as synonymous with impunity, denial and amnesia 
(Lambright 2015: 1; Fernández and Martin-Ortega 2017: 536; Üngör and Adler 2017: 614). 
In her work on Northern Ireland, for example, Lawther (2013: 169) notes that ‘Seeking to 
preserve their narratives of the past, many unionists have implicitly and explicitly met calls 
for truth with silence’.  
 
However, just as it is erroneous to view speech and silence as opposites, it is similarly 
problematic to dichotomize transitional justice and silence. Silence and speech represent ‘a 
communicative continuum of forms (linguistic items) from most to least verbal’ (Jaworski 
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1993: 46), and both forms have a role to play within transitional justice practice. If, as this 
article has maintained, silence reflects a core dialectical relationship between being and 
becoming, this relationship is highly pertinent to transitional justice. It is a dialectic, in short, 
that points to new agentic and transformative possibilities for victims within transitional 
justice processes. To develop this macro argument, this section explores four particular ways 
in which silence is relevant to transitional justice. 
 
Turning to the first of these, there are many potential means of addressing a legacy of past 
human rights abuses. Nevertheless, there has been ‘a significant institutionalization of 
transitional justice’ (McEvoy 2018: 185). This has led to growing criticisms of transitional 
justice as an overly top-down and elite-driven process (Sriram 2007; Lundy and McGovern 
2008; Andrieu 2010; Gready and Robins 2014; Macdonald 2017), wherein the leading roles 
are played by ‘transitional justice entrepreneurs’ (Madlingozi 2010). It is these actors who 
‘theorize the field; set the agenda…and ultimately not only represent and speak for victims 
but “produce” the victim’ (Madlingozi 2010: 226).  
 
For transitional justice processes to be successful, however, and to achieve at least some of 
their goals – which may include re-establishing the rule of law, restoring the dignity of 
victims and contributing to reconciliation – they need to ‘resonate’ on the ground.13 This 
means that they should ‘attend to critical on-the-ground realities, ranging from social 
structure, to local knowledge, to complex histories, and to the assumptions that underlie such 
endeavours’ (Hinton 2011: 17; see also Baines 2010: 415). Silence, it is argued, is highly 
relevant in this regard because it can help to bring locality and the quotidian more squarely 
into the purview of transitional justice. When silence is used as a form of resistance and/or 
survival strategy, for example, it can provide crucial and valuable insights into people’s 
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everyday lives, their environments and the challenges that they face. Such insights, in turn, 
can contribute to the development of more ‘grounded’ ways of doing transitional justice that 
have greater potential to strike a chord at the grassroots level – and thus to more effectively 
engage local communities in processes of dealing with the past. 
 
This brings us to a second reason for giving more attention to silence within transitional 
justice. There exists a strong presumption within the field that victims benefit from telling 
their stories. An exemplar of this is Robben’s (2011: 183) assertion that ‘The recovery of 
language and the retelling of the experiences are forms of restoration that are politically and 
emotionally rewarding’. Part of the process of allowing silences to ‘speak’, however, means 
not (prematurely) interrupting or disturbing them through superimposed ‘talking cures’. In 
this regard, a useful analogy can be made with psychoanalysis, where attention is not only 
given to what is said but also to what is not said. To cite Sabbadini (1991: 407), ‘one of our 
functions as psychoanalysts is to understand the meanings of our patients’ silences: learning 
about their inner worlds involves listening to their silences, not just to their words’.  
 
The broader point is that victims do not exist in isolation and hence the silences of those 
around them are also important. The family of the murdered anti-apartheid activist Steven 
Biko, for example, boycotted the South African TRC – a form of silence that effectively 
challenged the legitimacy of the TRC process (Swartz and Drennan 2001: 206). More 
particularly, this silence challenged ‘the ability of the Commission to grant amnesty and take 
away the right of people to obtain compensation’ (Roht-Arriaza et al. 1997: 329). To take 
another African example, following the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, the government developed 
a national unity and reconciliation policy as part of a broader transitional justice strategy. 
This policy included the creation, in 1999, of a National Unity and Reconciliation 
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Commission (NURC), mandated to ‘promote unity, reconciliation, and social cohesion 
among Rwandans…’ (Republic of Rwanda NURC n.d.). The policy, however, has 
encountered on-the-ground resistance, including what Thomson (2011: 453) has termed 
‘withdrawn muteness’. According to her, withdrawn muteness consists of ‘purposeful and 
strategic moments of silence that peasant Rwandans employ to defy the expectations of the 
policy in ways that either protect their meagre resources or assure their dignity in their 
interactions with local officials’ (Thomson 2011: 453).  
 
If silence, as in these examples, expresses agency, discontent and opposition, it can also be 
read as a form of ‘infrapolitics’ (Scott 2005: 65) – or everyday resistance intertwined with 
politics (Kelley 1993: 78). Infrapolitics has an obvious peace-building dimension; it not only 
expresses grassroots concerns and priorities, but it also indicates ‘the development of critical 
agency of a discursive nature whereby individuals and communities mobilize in hidden and 
fragmented ways for contextual and effectively hybrid forms of peace’ (Richmond 2012: 
118). By extension, there is an important infrapolitics of transitional justice that merits 
exploration. Fundamentally, ‘if we treat resistance as a valid object of inquiry, rather than 
dismiss it as a form of deviance problematic for policy goals, it can reveal the alternative 
visions of peace and justice that may be present in any given society’ (Jones 2016: 80; see 
also Jones and Bernath 2018). Enabling these visions to emerge and take shape is a critical 
part of developing more collaborative (and hence agentic) ways of doing transitional justice 
that re-position the relationship between ‘top’ and ‘bottom’ as one of synergy and 
partnership.  
 
A third key reason why silence matters is that it raises important issues about change and 
causality. Within transitional justice, it is voice and truth-telling that are associated with 
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processes of social change (Nagy 2013: 64); they allow communities and societies to re-build 
and move on. Silence, in contrast, is often viewed as inimical to change. Communities may 
be reluctant to speak about and to ‘face’ the past (Obradović-Wocnnik 2014: 339), and 
political actors may try to dictate ‘which memories can be publicly invoked and which must 
remain silenced’ (Igreja 2008: 55). Silence, however, is not necessarily an obstacle to change. 
If silence, as this article has argued, is a form of absence, ‘what is presently absent shapes 
what is to come’ (Norrie 2010: 38). More particularly, the shift from silence as being to 
becoming is a process of absenting – and hence of change (Norrie 2010: 31).  
 
This further reinforces the earlier point that silence has its own causal dynamics. Silence, for 
example, can enable formerly war-torn communities to function ‘normally’ without renewed 
bloodshed and hostility. Returning to the example of Foča in eastern BiH, Eastmond and 
Selimovic (2014: 524) note that ‘Silence, whether as a response to deeply painful memories 
or as a deliberate “holding back” to avoid provocation and conflict, appears as a rational way 
in which people navigate a new and uncertain social terrain’. In other words, if silence can be 
linked to change, those who maintain silence can be viewed as potential agents of change. 
Silence, in this regard, is not merely a state of being, but a processual becoming through 
living which truth-telling can subvert (Shaw and Waldorf 2010: 13). 
 
The fourth and final reason why silence is relevant to transitional justice is that it can reveal 
some of the ways in which individuals seek to manage their lives and to cope in situations 
where atrocities and gross human rights abuses have occurred (or are still occurring). 
Motsemme describes how many women living under the apartheid regime in South Africa 
kept silent in order to protect their loved-ones. While she frames this silence as resistance, it 
can also be viewed as a vicarious survival strategy. In her words, ‘this conscious form of 
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silence was imperative when one wanted to protect loved ones or fellow comrades who were 
hidden in the house, neighbouring towns, or had crossed borders and the state…’ (Motsemme 
2004: 918). The reality that many individuals in such situations actively find ways to cope 
and to deal with their experiences foregrounds an important resilience thematic (Ungar 2008) 
which, to date, has remained critically under-explored within transitional justice theory and 
practice.14 The emphasis within transitional justice on stories of suffering, rather than 
survival, often results in decontextualized and ‘diluted’ narrativity (Ryan 2010: 317). The 
acknowledgment of strategies of coping and positive adaptation can not only help to address 
this, but also to illuminate ‘the dynamic dimensions of the relationship between victimhood 
and agency’ (Rosland 2009: 298). This agency, in turn, reiterates the importance of creating 
spaces within the design and operationalization of transitional justice processes for those on 
the ground to articulate their fears, concerns and hopes – not only verbally but also non-
verbally (for example through artwork).15  
 
Conclusion 
 
According to Machery (1978: 86), ‘Speech eventually has nothing more to tell us: we 
investigate the silence, for it is the silence that is doing the speaking’. Arguing that silence 
can be an important form of communication, this article has examined some of the different 
ways in which it can speak through a focus on the inter-related themes of resistance and 
survival. While silence is often depicted as antithetical to processes of reckoning with the 
past, the central aim of this paper was to present a different perspective. If, as Sutton (2009: 
30) contends, ‘Silence in improvisation is part of the music and has a musical role and 
function’, the article has sought to demonstrate that silence also has a role and function within 
transitional justice. It has emphasized the transformative possibilities of silence – via a crucial 
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being-becoming dialectic – and transposed these possibilities to a transitional justice 
framework. Ultimately, it has argued that silence creates a space for developing more agentic 
and contextually-sensitive ways of doing transitional justice. 
 
A major challenge for transitional justice, thus, is to find ways of giving silence a ‘voice’. In 
relation to men and women who have suffered conflict-related sexual violence, one way in 
which it can do so is by not requiring them to consistently recount the details of the sexual 
violence, as well as to enable them to be something other than victims of sexual violence. 
During the South African TRC process, for example, women rarely spoke about sexual 
violations (Ross 2010: 73). Focusing instead on the consequences of more generalized forms 
of violence for those around them – their families and communities – they thereby ‘resisted 
the category of “rape victim” through which the TRC sought to define them…’ (Shaw and 
Waldorf 2010: 12). Respecting people’s silences about sexual violence is crucial not only for 
allowing these silences to speak and deliver meaning, but also for enabling other silenced 
aspects of their stories to emerge.  
 
The men and women with whom I have worked in BiH have told stories of multiple traumas 
(including forced displacement, physical beatings/torture and loss of loved ones), but also – 
in some cases – of survival, courage and hope. However, when they have participated in 
transitional justice processes, most commonly criminal trials, these other layers of their 
stories have remained submerged. In his research in secondary schools, Ollin (2008: 273) 
found that ‘Spatial silence was…important and many teachers talked about the importance of 
giving space for students to think or feel, by removing the immediacy of the teacher’s 
presence’. Such spaces are also needed within transitional justice, to give individuals more 
freedom in deciding which aspects of their stories they wish to share – and how. 
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Notes 
                                                                
1 The issue of how to refer to men and women who have suffered conflict-related sexual violence is a complex 
one. In this article, the terminology of ‘victims–/survivors’ is used to reflect the fact that individuals may view 
themselves as victims, as survivors or indeed as both. However, no terminology is fully inclusive and it is 
recognized that some individuals may not identify as either victims or survivors. In discussing transitional 
justice, the article uses the term ‘victims’, to reflect the terminology commonly used in transitional justice 
practice.   
 
2 Men have been consistently overlooked (see Clark 2017c). 
 
3 Corollary discharge has been discussed in relation to schizophrenia as an example of defective efference copy. 
This can help to explain why patients experience, inter alia, ‘auditory verbal hallucinations’ (Ford and Mathalon 
2004: 38).  
 
4 Jaworski (1993: 22), for example, notes that Najavo children ‘…are more visual in their approach to learning 
about the surrounding world. They depend more on moving freely around in their environment and exploring 
natural objects by touching them; in indoor play, for example, gestures and touching are often used among 
native American children, but words are seldom used’. 
 
5 Examples of ‘co-operative silence’ can also be found within the animal world. As one illustration, Chiu et al. 
(2008: 13118) describe how ‘…echolocating big brown bats employ a surprising jamming avoidance strategy, 
silence. The relation between the occurrence of silent behavior and the spatial separation and heading of the 
paired bats indicates that one bat stopped vocalizing to avoid interference with another bat’s echo location’.  
 
6 According to Gearhart and Zhang (2018: 40), ‘Although empirical applications of the [spiral of silence] theory 
to online contexts are limited, results generally support notions that the spiral of silence theory is alive and well 
in online settings’. 
 
7 Roberts (2000: 928), for example, notes that ‘silence on the part of women of color contains a paradox: our 
silence may be a product of oppression or it may be a means of resistance against oppression’.  
 
8 It was indigenous African Christian women who established the movement. 
9 According to the judgement of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in the 
case of Prosecutor v. Karadžić (2016: §839), ‘Prior to the war the population of Foča was approximately 40,000 
and consisted of about 52% Bosnian Muslims, 45% Bosnian Serbs, and about 3% who were Montenegrin’. 
 
10 Bosniaks are now a minority in Foča, which was temporarily renamed ‘Srbinje’ during the Bosnian war 
(SENSE Agency 2014). 
 
11 In 1993, the United Nations (UN) Security Council established the ICTY to prosecute some of the many 
crimes committed during the wars in the former Yugoslavia. The Tribunal, which completed its mandate at the 
end of 2017, claimed that its judgements ‘have contributed to creating a historical record, combatting denial and 
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preventing attempts at revisionism…’ (ICTY n.d). In reality, its work has had little impact on diluting 
competing ethnic narratives and denial remains strong across BiH (Clark 2014) – including in Foča (Remiković 
2011). 
 
12 Pickering (2000: 73) points out that ‘Women from nationalist backgrounds invariably reported engaging in 
direct verbal abuse with the individual members of the security forces or, alternatively, remained completely 
silent in defiance of the security forces’. 
 
13 Franke (2006: 822), for example, remarks that ‘Some scholars have launched an allied criticism of truth and 
reconciliation commissions to the extent that they privilege certain kinds of memory practices that find their 
roots in the United States and Europe and do not have cultural resonance in communities that value “forgive and 
forget” methods of collective healing’. 
 
14 This is an important gap which the author’s current research – funded by the European Research Council – is 
seeking to address. 
 
15 Focused on contemporary artworks in Northern Ireland, for example, Bell (2011: 325) maintains that ‘The 
artworks become sites in which the assumptions of transition are opened up for critical reflection, probing the 
notion of what constitutes Peace and its conditions of possibility’.  
 
 
 
 
 
References 
 
Acheson K (2008) Silence as gesture: Rethinking the nature of communicative silences. 
Communication Theory 18(4): 535–555. 
 
Addis ME and Mahalik JR (2003) Men, masculinity and the contexts of help seeking. 
American Psychologist 58(1): 5–14. 
 
Ahrens CE (2006) Being silenced: The impact of negative social reactions on the disclosure 
of rape. American Journal of Community Psychology 38 (3-4): 263–274. 
 
Alcalá PR and Baines E (2012) Editorial note. International Journal of Transitional Justice 
6(3): 385–393. 
 
Alija Fernández RA and Martin-Ortega O (2017) Silence and the right to justice: Confronting 
impunity in Spain. International Journal of Human Rights 21(5): 531–549. 
 
Alison J (2006) The third victim in Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser. The Germanic Review: 
Literature, Culture, Theory 81(2): 163–178. 
 
Andrieu K (2010) Civilizing peacebuilding: Transitional justice, civil society and the liberal 
paradigm. Security Dialogue 41(5): 537–558. 
 
Arciola CR, Campoccia D and Montanaro L (2018) Implant infections: Adhesion, biofilm 
formation and immune evasion. Nature Reviews Microbiology 16: 397–409. 
 
Baines E (2010) Spirits and social reconstruction after mass violence: Rethinking transitional 
justice. African Affairs 109(436): 409–430. 
 
31 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Baines E and Stewart B (2011) “I cannot accept what I have not done”: Storytelling, gender 
and transitional justice. Journal of Human Rights Practice 3(3): 245–263. 
 
Baker SJ (1955) The theory of silences. The Journal of General Psychology 53(1): 145–167. 
 
Basso KH (1970) “To give up on words”: Silence in Western Apache culture. Journal of 
Anthropological Research 26(3): 213–230. 
 
Bell V (2011) Contemporary art and transitional justice in Northern Ireland: The consolation 
of form. Journal of Visual Culture 19(3): 324–353. 
 
Bhaskar R (2008) Dialectic: The Pulse of Freedom. London: Routledge. 
 
Boraine A (2006) Transitional justice: A holistic interpretation. Journal of International 
Affairs 60(1): 17–27. 
 
Broussard PA (2008) Female genital mutilation: Exploring strategies for ending ritualized 
torture; Shaming, blaming and utilizing the convention against torture. Duke Journal of 
Gender Law & Policy 15: 19–47. 
 
Burman A (2001) Chachawarmi: Silence and rival voices on decolonisation and gender 
politics in Andean Bolivia. Latin American Studies 43: 65–91. 
 
Chiu C, Xian W and Moss CF (2008) Flying in silence: Echolocating bats cease vocalizing to 
avoid sonar jamming. PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United 
States of America) 105(35): 3115–3120. 
 
Clark JN (2014) International Trials and Reconciliation: Assessing the Impact of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Clark JN (2017a) Rape, Sexual Violence and Transitional Justice Challenges: Lessons from 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Clark JN (2017b) Working with survivors of war rape and sexual violence: Fieldwork 
reflections from Bosnia-Hercegovina. Qualitative Research 17(4): 424–439. 
 
Clark JN (2017c) Masculinity and male survivors of wartime sexual violence: A Bosnian 
case study. Conflict, Security and Development 17(4): 287–311. 
 
Clark JN (2018a) Transitional justice, education and sexual violence stigma: The results of a 
schools-based study in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Journal of Law and Society 45(4): 509–537. 
 
Covarrubius P (2007) (Un)biased in Western theory: Generative silence in American Indian 
communication. Communication Monographs 74(2): 265–271. 
 
Creed WED (2003) Voice lessons: Tempered radicalism and the use of voice and silence. 
Management Studies 40(6): 1503–1536. 
 
32 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Crenshaw K (1992) Race, gender and sexual harassment. Southern California Law Review 
65: 1467–1476. 
 
Das V (1996) Language and body: Transactions in the construction of pain. Daedalus 125(1): 
67–91. 
 
Dave N (2014) The politics of silence: Music, violence and protest in Guinea. 
Ethnomusicology 58(1): 1–29. 
 
David P (2017) What we know about transitional justice: Survey and experimental evidence. 
Advances in Political Psychology 38(1): 151–177. 
 
Davidson JW and Correia JS (2001) Meaningful musical performance: A bodily experience. 
Research Studies in Music Education 17(1): 70–83. 
 
Dotson K (2011) Tracking epistemic violence, tracking practices of silencing. Hypatia: A 
Journal of Feminist Philosophy 26(2): 236–257. 
 
Eastmond M and Selimovic JM (2014) Silence as possibility in postwar everyday life. 
International Journal of Transitional Justice 6(3): 502–524. 
 
Ellison M (2015) Magazine: The girls of the Lord’s Resistance Army. Available at: 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2015/05/magazine-girls-lord-resistance-army-
150527110756222.html (accessed 2 July 2018). 
 
European Parliament (2013) Policy briefing: The democratic transition in Guinea reaches a 
critical point. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/briefing_note/join/2013/491507/EXPO-
DEVE_SP(2013)491507_EN.pdf (accessed 5 July 2018). 
 
Feinberg I (1978) Efference copy and corollary discharge: Implications for thinking and its 
disorders. Schizophrenia Bulletin 4(4): 636–640. 
 
Ford JM and Mathalon DH (2004) Electrophysiological evidence of corollary discharge 
dysfunction in schizophrenia during talking and thinking. Journal of Psychiatric Research 
38(1): 37–46. 
 
Ford JM and Mathalon DH (2005) Corollary discharge dysfunction in schizophrenia: Can it 
explain auditory hallucinations? International Journal of Psychophysiology 58: 179–189. 
 
Franke KM (2006) Gendered subjects of transitional justice. Columbia Journal of Gender 
Law 15(3): 813–828. 
 
Frichova M (2009) Transitional justice and Georgia’s conflicts: Breaking the silence. 
Available at: https://www.ictj.org/sites/default/files/ICTJ-Georgia-Breaking-Silence-2009-
English.pdf (accessed 2 July 2018). 
 
33 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Frith CD and Done DJ (1988) Towards a neuropsychology of schizophrenia. The British 
Journal of Psychiatry 153(4): 447–453. 
 
Fivush R (2010) Speaking silence: The social construction of silence in autobiographical and 
cultural narratives. Memory 18(2): 88–98. 
 
Gatwiri GJ and Mumbi KA (2016) Silence as power: Women bargaining with patriarchy in 
Kenya. Social Alternatives 35(1): 13–18. 
 
Gearhart S and Zhang W (2018) Same spiral, different day? Testing the spiral of silence 
across issue types. Communication Research 45(1): 34–54. 
 
Gilbert EL (1986) Silence and survival in Rudyard Kipling’s art and life. English Literature 
in Transition, 1880-1920 29(2): 115–126. 
 
Goralwalla IA, Leontiev Y, Özsu MT, Szafron D and Combi C (2001) Temporal granularity: 
Completing the puzzle. Journal of Intelligent Information Systems 16(1): 41–63. 
 
Gready P and Robins S (2014) From transitional to transformative justice: A new agenda for 
practice. International Journal of Transitional Justice 8(3): 339–361. 
 
Gurevitch Z (2001) Dialectical dialogue: The struggle for speech, repressive silence and the 
shift to multiplicity. British Journal of Sociology 52(2): 87–104. 
 
Haddad B (2004) The manyano movement in South Africa: Site of struggle, survival and 
resistance. Agenda: Empowering Women for Gender Equity 18(61): 4–13. 
 
Hatzisavvidou S (2015) Disturbing binaries in political thought: Silence as political activism. 
Social Movement Studies 14(5): 509–522. 
 
Hall-Stoodley L, Costerton JW and Stoodley P (2004) Bacterial biofilms: From the natural 
environment to infectious diseases. Nature Reviews Microbiology 2: 95–108. 
 
Hao RN (2011) Rethinking critical pedagogy: Implications on silence and silent bodies. Text 
and Performance Quarterly 31(3): 267–284. 
 
Hegde RS (1996) Narratives of silence: Rethinking gender, agency, and power from the 
communication experiences of battered women in South India. Communication Studies 47(4): 
303–317. 
 
Hinton AL (2011) Introduction: Toward an anthropology of transitional justice. In: Hinton 
AL (ed) Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after Genocide and 
Mass Violence. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp.1–22. 
 
Hume M (2007) Mano dura: El Salvador responds to gangs. Development in Practice 17(6): 
739–751. 
 
34 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Hume M (2008) The myths of violence: Gender, conflict and community in El Salvador. 
Latin American Perspectives 35(5): 59–76. 
 
ICTY (n.d.) Achievements. Available at: http://www.icty.org/en/about/tribunal/achievements 
(accessed 15 June 2018). 
 
Igreja V (2008) Memories as weapons: The politics of peace and silence in post-civil war 
Mozambique. Journal of Southern Africa Studies 34(3): 539–556. 
 
International Crisis Group (2017) El Salvador’s politics of perpetual violence. Available at: 
https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/central-america/el-salvador/64-el-
salvadors-politics-perpetual-violence (accessed 28 June 2018). 
 
International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights (2011) IHF Fact-finding mission to 
Eastern Bosnia (Area of the municipalities of Goražde and Foča), 9 – 11 April 2001. 
Available at: http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/46963ae8d.pdf (accessed 30 June 2018). 
 
Jaworski A (1993) The Power of Silence: Social and Pragmatic Perspectives. Newbury Park, 
CA: SAGE Publications. 
 
Jaworski A and Sachdev I (1998) Beliefs about silence in the classroom. Language and 
Education 12(4): 273–292. 
 
Jetly R (2003) Conflict management strategies in ASEAN: Perspectives for SAARC. The 
Pacific Review 16(1): 53–76. 
 
Johnson TAM (2011) On silence, sexuality and skeletons: Reconceptualizing narrative in 
asylum hearings. Social and Legal Studies 20(1): 57–78. 
 
Jones B (2016) Analyzing resistance to transitional justice: What can we learn from 
hybridity? Conflict and Society: Advances in Research 2: 74–86. 
 
Jones B and Bernath J (2018) (eds) Resistance and Transitional Justice. Abingdon: 
Routledge. 
 
Kebede MT, Hilden PK and Middelthon AL (2014) Negotiated silence: The management of 
the self as a moral subject in young Ethiopian women's discourse about sexuality. Sex 
Education 14(6): 666–7678. 
 
Kelley RDG (1993) “We are not what we seem”: Rethinking Black working-class opposition 
in the Jim Crow South. Journal of American History 80(1): 75–112. 
 
Kidron, C (2009) Toward an ethnography of silence: The lived presence of the past in the 
everyday life of Holocaust trauma survivors and their descendants in Israel. Current 
Anthropology 50(1): 5–27. 
 
Kovras I (2013) Explaining prolonged silences in transitional justice: The disappeared in 
Cyprus and Spain. Comparative Political Studies 46(6): 730–756. 
35 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Lambright A (2015) Andean Truths: Transitional Justice, Ethnicity and Cultural Production 
in Post-Shining Path Peru. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press. 
 
Lawther C (2012) Denial, silence and the politics of the past: Unpicking the opposition to 
truth recovery in Northern Ireland. International Journal of Transitional Justice 7(1): 157–
177. 
 
Levin FM (2006) Recent findings in neuroscience and their relevance to psychoanalysis. 
Psychoanalytic Quarterly 75(4): 1227–1244.  
 
Li HL (2004) Rethinking silencing silences. Counterpoints 240: 69–86. 
 
Ligiéro DP, Fassinger R, McCauley M, Moore J and Lyytinen (2009) Childhood sexual 
abuse, culture and coping: A qualitative study of Latinas.  Psychology of Women Quarterly 
33: 67–80. 
 
Lundy P and McGovern M (2008) Whose justice? Rethinking transitional justice from the 
bottom up. Journal of Law and Society 35(2): 265–292. 
 
Macdonald A (2017) Transitional justice and political economies of survival in post-conflict 
Northern Uganda. Development and Change 48(2): 286–311. 
 
Madlingozi T (2010) On transitional justice entrepreneurs and the production of victims. 
Journal of Human Rights Practice 2(2): 208–228. 
 
Mann T (1967) The Magic Mountain. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 
 
Mathiesen T (2004) Silently Silenced: Essays on the Creation of Acquiescence in Modern 
Society. Winchester: Waterside Press. 
 
McEvoy K (2018) Travel, dilemmas and nonrecurrence: Observations on the 
“respectabilisation” of transitional justice. International Journal of Transitional Justice 
12(2): 185–193. 
 
Milliken FJ and Morrison EW (2003) Shades of silence: Emerging themes and future 
directions for research on silence in organizations. Journal of Management Studies 40(6): 
1563–1568. 
 
Motsemme N (2004) The mute always speak: On women’s silences at the truth and 
reconciliation commission. Current Sociology 52(5): 909–932. 
 
Mushin I and Gardner R (2009) Silence is talk: Conversational silence in Australian 
Aboriginal talk-in-interaction. Journal of Pragmatics 41(10): 2033–2052. 
 
Nagy R (2013) The scope and bounds of transitional justice and the Canadian truth and 
reconciliation commission. International Journal of Transitional Justice 7(1): 52–73. 
 
36 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Naples NA (2003) Deconstructing and locating survivor discourse: Dynamics of narrative, 
empowerment and resistance for survivors of childhood sexual abuse. Signs: Journal of 
Women in Culture and Society 28(4): 1151–1185. 
 
Noelle-Neumann E (1974) The spiral of silence: Theory of public opinion. Journal of 
Communication 24 (2): 43–51. 
 
Norrie A (2010) Dialectic and Difference: Dialectical Critical Realism and the Grounds of 
Justice. Abingdon: Routledge. 
 
Obradović-Wochnik J (2013) The “silent dilemma” of transitional justice: Silencing and 
coming to terms with the past in Serbia. International Journal of Transitional Justice 7(2): 
328–347. 
 
O’Leary PJ and Barber J (2008) Gender differences in silencing following childhood sexual 
abuse. Journal of Childhood Sexual Abuse 17(2): 133–143. 
 
Ollin R (2008) Silent pedagogy and rethinking classroom practice: Structuring teaching 
through silence rather than talk. Cambridge Journal of Education 38(2): 265–280. 
 
Pagis M (2010) Producing intersubjectivity in silence: An ethnographic study of meditation 
practice. Ethnography 11(2): 309–328. 
 
Picard M (1988) The World of Silence. Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway. 
 
Pickering S (2000) Women, the home and resistance in Northern Ireland. Women and 
Criminal Justice 11(3): 49–82. 
 
Pittinger RE, Hockett CF and Danehy JJ (1960) The First Five Minutes: A Sample of 
Microscopic Interview Analysis. Ithaca, NY: Paul Martineau. 
 
Poland B and Pedersen A (1998) Reading between the lines: Interpreting silences in 
qualitative research. Qualitative Inquiry 4(2): 293–312. 
 
Poulet JFA and Hedwig B (2006) New insights into corollary discharges mediated by 
identified neural pathways. TRENDS in Neurosciences 30(1): 14–21. 
 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Kovač and Vuković (2001) Case No. IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1-T, 
ICTY Trial Chamber judgement. 
 
Prosecutor v. Karadžić (2016) Case No. T-95-5/18-T, ICTY Trial Chamber judgement. 
 
Remiković D (2011) Thousands of Bosnian Serbs rally in support of Mladić. Available at: 
http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bosnian-serbs-ready-major-rally-in-support-of-
mladic (accessed 5 July 2018). 
 
Republic of Rwanda NURC (n.d.) NURC mission. Available at: 
http://www.nurc.gov.rw/index.php?id=84 (accessed 5 July 2018). 
37 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Richmond OP (2012) A pedagogy of peacebuilding: Infrapolitics, resistance and liberation. 
International Political Sociology 6(2): 115–131. 
 
Robben ACGM (2011) Testimonies, truths and transitions of justice in Argentina and Chile. 
In: Hinton AL (ed) Transitional Justice: Global Mechanisms and Local Realities after 
Genocide and Mass Violence. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, pp.179–205. 
 
Roberts DE (2000) The paradox of silence: Some questions about silence as resistance. 
Michigan Journal of Race and Law 5: 927–941. 
 
Roht-Arriaza N, Schey PA and Shelton DL (1997) Addressing human rights abuses: Truth 
commissions and the value of amnesty. Whittier Law Review 19: 325–344.  
 
Rosland S (2009) Victimhood, identity and agency in the early phase of the Troubles in 
Northern Ireland. Identities: Global Studies in Culture and Power 16(3): 294–320. 
 
Ross FC (2010) An acknowledged failure: Women, voice, violence and the South African 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In: Shaw R, Waldorf L, with Hazan P (eds) Localizing 
Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, pp.69–91. 
 
Roth JI (2004) Reading and misreading The Reader. Law and Literature 16(2): 163–177. 
 
Rowe AC and Malhotra S (2013) Still the silence: Feminist reflections at the edges of sound. 
In: Malhotra S and Rowe AC (eds) Silence, Feminism, Power: Reflections at the Edges of 
Sound. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 1–23. 
 
Ryan ML (2010) Narrativity and its modes as culture-transcending analytical categories. 
Japan Forum 21(3): 307–323. 
 
Sabbadini A (1991) Listening to silence. British Journal of Psychotherapy 7(4): 406–415. 
 
Schlink B (2008) The Reader, translated from German by Brown Janeway C. London: 
Phoenix. 
 
Scott JC (2005) The infrapolitics of subordinate groups. In: Amoore L (ed) The Global 
Resistance Reader. Abingdon: Routledge, pp.65–73. 
 
SENSE Agency (2014) How Foča became Srbinje. Available at: http://www.sense-
agency.com/icty/how-foca-became-srbinje.29.html?cat_id=1&news_id=16221 (accessed 18 
June 2018). 
 
Shaw R and Waldorf L, with Hazan P (2010) (eds) Localizing Transitional Justice: 
Interventions and Priorities after Mass Violence. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
 
Shaw R and Waldorf L (2010) Introduction: Localizing Transitional Justice. In: Shaw R, 
Waldorf L, with Hazan P (eds) Localizing Transitional Justice: Interventions and Priorities 
after Mass Violence. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp.1–26. 
38 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
Sperry RW (1950) Neural basis of spontaneous optokinetic response produced by visual 
inversion. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 43(6): 482–489. 
 
Sriram C (2007) Justice as peace? Liberal peacebuilding and strategies of transitional justice. 
Global Society 21(4): 579–591. 
 
Stabbert MN (2009) Memory, history and guilt in Bernhard Schlink’s der Vorleser. 
Fundamina 15(2): 136–158. 
 
Sutton JP (2003) “The pause that follows”…Silence, improvised music and music therapy. 
Nordic Journal of Music Therapy 11(1):  27–38. 
 
Swales M (2003) Sex, shame and guilt: Reflections on Bernhard Schlink’s Der Vorleser (The 
Reader) and J.M. Coetzee’s Disgrace. Journal of European Studies 33(1): 7–22. 
 
Swartz L and Drennan G (2001) The cultural construction of healing in the truth and 
reconciliation commission: Implications for mental health practice. Ethnicity and Health 5(3–
4): 205–213. 
 
Thomson S (2011) Whispering truth to power: The everyday resistance of Rwandan peasants 
to post-genocide reconciliation. African Affairs 110(440): 439–456. 
 
Ungar M (2008) Resilience across cultures. British Journal of Social Work 38(2): 218–235. 
 
Üngör UÜ and Adler N (2017) Indonesia in the global context of genocide and transitional 
justice. Journal of Genocide Research 19(4): 609–617.  
 
United Nations (2010) Guidance note of the Secretary-General: United Nations approach to 
transitional justice. Available at: 
https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/files/TJ_Guidance_Note_March_2010FINAL.pdf (accessed 3 
June 2018). 
 
UN News (2017) Wrapping up visit, UN rights chief urges El Salvador to address femicide 
and abortion ban. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2017/11/636552-wrapping-visit-
un-rights-chief-urges-el-salvador-address-femicide-and-abortion (accessed 2 July 2018). 
 
Vera I (2002) Without a Name and Under the Tongue. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. 
 
Wagner R (2012) Silence as resistance before the subject, or could the subaltern remain 
silent? Theory, Culture and Society 29(6): 99–124. 
 
Weiss KG (2010) Male sexual victimization: Examining men’s experiences of rape and 
sexual assault. Men and Masculinities 12(3): 275–298. 
 
Wolf S (2017) Mano Dura: The Politics of Gang Control in El Salvador. Austin, TX: 
University of Texas Press. 
 
 
 
